

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING (I): DECISION-MAKING MODELS

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ABSTRACT. The psychology of decision-making has been gaining more attention than before. It is growing rapidly. Three main perspectives of the psychology of decision making include the standpoint of cognitive psychology, the influence of social psychology and the viewpoint of neuropsychology. This influence is obvious in the field on international relations, especially the foreign policy decision making. This study represents the first part in which we will present the models of decision-making in international relations: rational actor, organizational politics, bureaucratic politics, cybernetic model, prospect theory and poliheuristic model. The example on which we will demonstrate de models of foreign policy decision- making is the decision of not invading Irak from 1991.

Keywords: *decision-making process, Rational Actor Model, Organizational Politics Model, Bureaucratic Politics Model.*

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG. Die Psychologie des Entscheidungstreffens bekommt immer mehr Aufmerksamkeit als früher und wird immer bedeutender. Die drei wichtigsten Perspektiven der Psychologie des Entscheidungstreffens enthalten die Gesichtspunkte der kognitiven Psychologie, die Einflüsse der Sozialpsychologie und die Aussichtspunkte der Neuropsychologie. Dieser Einfluss ist auf dem Gebiet der internationalen Beziehungen ersichtlich, besonders bei dem Entscheidungstreffen der Außenpolitik. Diese Studie repräsentiert den ersten Teil, in dem wir die Modelle des Entscheidungstreffens in den internationalen Beziehungen vorstellen: rationaler Täter, Organisationspolitik, bürokratische Politik, kybernetisches Modell, die Prospect-Theorie, poliheuristisches Modell. Das Beispiel, womit wir die Modelle des außenpolitischen Entscheidungstreffens darstellen, ist die Entscheidung aus dem Jahre 1991 Irak nicht zu überfallen.

Schlüsselwörter: *der Prozess des Entscheidungstreffens, das Modell des Rationalen Täters, das Modell der Organisationspolitik, das Modell von der Politik der Bürokratie.*

Introduction

The psychology of decision-making includes three major approaches – from cognitive, social, and neurological perspectives. Each has contributed to the field and has gained much attention in the scientific disciplines beyond psychology. The crucial question is: What will be the next step of the psychology of decision-making? The

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progress of a general theory may be needed. In the past decades, the research on psychology and decision-making has benefited from inspiring theories, such as prospect theory. Over the past thirty years, research has progressed more in generating middle-level theories than in constructing integrative theories. The impressive middle-level theories, the elaborated experimental techniques, and the abundant empirical findings have accumulated building blocks for new theories. The emergence of new integrative theories may contribute greatly to the further development of this field (Zhang, 2009).

An understanding of the impact of self-esteem on choices may facilitate the formation of an integrative theory on motivation and decision-making. People are motivated to defend, maintain and enhance their self-esteem. In social psychology, a large amount of research has documented the importance of self-esteem in shaping goals, emotion and cognition (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, Zhang, 2007; Zhang, Baumeister, 2006; Baumeister, 1998; Larrick, 1993). Recent research has started to explore how self-esteem influences individual choices and interpersonal negotiations (Kahneman, Tversky, 2000; Lerner, Keltner, 2001; Loewenstein, Read, Baumeister, 2003). Future research should construct a theory on the role of self-esteem in decision-making.

The psychology of decision-making has emerged in the field of foreign policy, a field where, on different degrees, situations implying options appear: from the beginning of a war, to a peace settlement, to the making of an alliance, or a settlement of diplomatic relations, an implementation of a certain position, an imposition of economical sanctions and a ratification of conventions.

The foreign policy decision-making is related to the choices that individual, groups or coalitions make which affect a nation's actions on the international field. The decisions in the field of foreign policy are characterized by whatever is at stake, by a great uncertainty and by a substantial risk (Renshon, Renshon, 2008). The studies in the field of international relations are focused on the actions of the states and of their leaders. In order to decode these actions, it is useful to know what stands behind these decisions, what puts pressure on an action or an event. The foreign policy decision-making is an important field of research, because the way in which a decision is made could shape an eventual choice (Mintz, De Rouen, 2010). This is a reason why an actor could achieve a different result through the process of decision-making.

An analysis of foreign policy decisions can present the cognitive processes that lead to foreign policy making and “get inside the minds” of the leaders who make the decisions. It can also help identify the unique and general patterns of decisions and generate insights about leadership styles and personalities that cannot be revealed through a systemic approach to foreign policy analysis. Such an approach to foreign policy analysis has the potential to make a broad and important contribution to the study of international relations (Puscas, 2009). Foreign policy decision-making can provide deeper understandings of biases, motivations, and perceptions. Moreover, the growth and development of theories of cognitive psychology and decision theory directly spurred advances in foreign policy decision-making (Mintz, De Rouen, 2010).

This study will present a psychological approach to decision making. The benefits of such an approach are its ability to explain not only the outcomes of decisions, but also the processes and distortions that lead to decisions and the decision dynamics. In contrast to other approaches such as rational choice, a psychological approach to decision making focuses on the process validity as well as the outcome validity. Furthermore, the psychological approach deals with information search and processing as well as with biases and errors in decision-making. The rational choice approach does not fully describe how decision-making is affected by cognitive biases. However, if we are to understand decision-making, we need to understand how information processing is limited and how various biases, search patterns, and decision rules affect decision-making (Puscas, 2009).

This article will begin with an argumentation for using the psychological approach in the analysis of foreign policy, followed by the framing of the models of decision making in foreign policy. The example by which we will demonstrate the models of foreign policy decision-making is the decision of not invading Irak in 1991.

Foreign policy decision making

Most of what we read about international affairs concerns only the actions of the states and their leaders. The course of world politics is shaped by the decisions of the leaders. The uncertainty involved in foreign policy making can pertain to an opponent’s motives, beliefs, intentions, or calculations. If we can understand how decisions are made, we can better understand and, perhaps more importantly, predict the outcomes on the international arena. The key determinants of foreign policy decisions are displayed in the next figure:




Fig. no. 1: Determinants of Foreign Policy Decisions (after Mintz, De Roune, 2010, p.4)

Foreign policy decision-making consists of four components (Robinson, Snyder, 1965): (1) identifying the decision problem; (2) searching for alternatives; (3) choosing an alternative, and (4) implementing the alternative.

We make decisions every day. Some of these decisions require very little thought, others must be made quickly. Mintz and DeRouen (2010) gave the example of a traffic accident where a traffic reporter on the radio says that there is an accident just a mile ahead on the road that you are driving on, you would need to think quickly about a course of action.

Although the stakes are much higher, these everyday decision dynamics also occur at the foreign policy level. In the driving analogy, the actor could try to compare the costs and benefits of several alternatives. The options could include waiting until the accident clears or taking the first possible exit in hope for saving some time. In the face of uncertainty, comparing costs and benefits may be more difficult. The actor might think back to some previous experience that approximates the current situation. The use of analogies might provide a mental shortcut that can save time and effort. Perhaps in a similar past experience, the driver had detoured and was easily able to navigate back to the main road. Analogies can work in foreign policy, but are sometimes misleading and can lead to suboptimal outcomes (Mintz, DeRouen, 2010).

An approach to foreign policy analysis focusing on decision-making is vital to a comprehensive understanding of foreign policy behavior, of the world policy, and of the specific policies of nations. Foreign policy decision-making is equipped with theories and models that help us understand how errors, uncertainty, domestic politics, and various decision units can shape decisions.

Models of decision-making

The most important models in foreign policy analysis are: Rational Actor Model, Organizational Politics Model and Bureaucratic Politics Models. Besides these “classical” models (Allison, Zelikow, 2010), specialists mentioned cognitive models, such as Cybernetic Models, Prospect Theory, and an Integrating Model of rational and cognitive approaches, Poliheuristic Theory. Mintz and De Rouen (2010) consider Organizational Politics Model and Bureaucratic Politics Models as cognitive models. It is not the purpose of this article to debate the appartenance of models to each approach, but to show different ways of interpreting a decisions. Because of the limited space of this article, we will presented this time only the “classical” models of decision-making.

Mintz and DeRouen (2010) speak about the cognitive and rational schools offering different understandings of decision-making. They use a model given by Herbert Simon in 1985, who came up with interesting anthropological-like terms to distinguish between rational and cognitive decision makers. He coined the terms *Homo economicus* to refer to the former, and *Homo psychologicus* to refer to the latter. Simon distinguished *cognitive models* on the basis that they assume decision makers have limited information-processing capabilities. Instead of objectively searching

all information for the best outcome, decision makers will select an acceptable alternative. Whereas the rational school focuses on the maximizing behavior and the comparison of costs and benefits, the cognitive school probes *how humans make decisions* and learn in a limited rational environment. Furthermore, the cognitive school takes into account that humans are selective in the information they use in decision making, use incomplete search processes, and are more likely to select a satisfactory rather than an optimal alternative.

What we have to underline is the fact that an analysis in foreign policy doesn't have to remain stuck to one model, but to use more of them according to the characteristics of the given situation/event, in order to help the political decision makers to choose the best alternative.

A synthetical table for these three classical models of decision-making was presented by Marike Breuning (2007) and Holsti (2006). Breuning goes with three elements in her comparison: determinants of policy, key actors and decision's process. Holsti distinguished between decisions made by organizations, groups and individuals and has the following as reference points: conceptualization of decision making, premises, constraints on rational decision making and sources of theory, insights and evidence.

Table no. 1

Models of decisions making (after Beurning, 2007, p.97)

	1. Rational Policy Model	2. Organizational Process Model	3. Bureaucratic Politics Model
Policy is determined by:	national interest	organizational inertia and feasibility	complex bargaining among individuals and agencies
Key actor(s):	Government, acting as if it is a single, rational decision maker	Organizations, acting on the basis of standard operating procedures (SOP's)	Individuals, guided by role and self-interest
Decision Process:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Identify national interest 2. Identify options 3. Cost/Benefit analysis of options 4. Choose policy alternative that best serves national interest 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organizational expertise and interests determine preferences 2. Adapt SOP's 3. Feasibility determines policy choice 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Horizontal: interests determined by role and employing agency 2. Vertical: interests determined by place in hierarchy 3. Bargaining and other political maneuvering determine policy choice

Table no. 2**Models of decision-making (after Holsti, 2006, p. 329)**

	Bureaucratic politics	Group dynamics	Individual decision making
Conceptualization of decision making	Decision making as the result of bargaining within bureaucratic	Decision making as the product of group interaction	Decision making as the result of individual choice
Premises	Central organizational values are imperfectly internalized Organizational behavior is political behavior Structure and SOPs affect substance and quality of decisions	Most decisions are made by small elite groups Group is different than the sum of its members Group dynamics affect substance and quality of decisions	Importance of subjective appraisal (definition of the situation) and cognitive processes (information processing, etc.)
Constraints on rational decision making	Imperfect information, resulting from: centralization, hierarchy, and specialization Organizational inertia Conflict between individual and organizational utilities Bureaucratic politics and bargaining dominate decision making and implementation of decisions	Groups may be more effective for some tasks, less for others Pressures for conformity Risk-taking propensity of groups (controversial) Quality of leadership “Groupthink”	Cognitive limits on rationality Information processing distorted by cognitive consistency dynamics (unmotivated biases) Systematic and motivated biases in causal analysis Individual differences in abilities related to decision making (e.g., problem-solving ability, tolerance of ambiguity, defensiveness and anxiety, information seeking, etc.)
Sources of theory, insights, and evidence	Organization theory Sociology of bureaucracies Bureaucratic politics	Social psychology Sociology of small groups	Cognitive dissonance Cognitive psychology Dynamic psychology

An interesting classification of decision-making models belongs to Saikaly (2009): (1) realism and rational choice, (2) bureaucratic politics, and (3) psychology, which includes: (a) small group dynamics, and (b) cognition. She argued that none

of these explanatory variables address the question of preconceived agendas that decision makers bring with them when assuming office. Saikaly thinks that there are foreign policy cases in which the presence of a preexisting solution in the right place, at the right time, and under the right conditions, helps the solution land on the agenda; in that sense, the solution predates the problem, and therefore, foreign-policy making can be *proactive*.

A challenging classification of models of decision-making process made by Gross Stein (2008), distinguishes between the following: rational, psychological and neurological models. The new element is the neuroscience approach, which recasts the role of rational model and opens the system design (of models of decision-making) that can improve foreign policy decision-making.

The new research from the neuroscience domain (Damasio, 2005) does not eliminate the possibility of learning and change. Reflection may come after choices, but it prepares decision makers for the next decision. The challenge is to understand far better how and when emotions are engaged with reflection and reasoning.

We have to mention the approaches of level-analysis realized by Jackson and Sorensen (2007). The foreign policy analysis is divided into three levels: the systemic level, the nation-state level and the level of the individual decision-maker. At each level-analysis, there is a correspondence with the models of decision-making as following: at systemic level with the Rational Actor Model, at nation-state level with bureaucratic politics model and “groupthink”, and at individual decision-maker level with the cognitive approach, as well as the psychological factors that influence the decision-making process.

Yetiv (2004) used the level-analysis pattern when he interpreted the event of going to war in the Persian Gulf by three models: Rational Actor Model, the cognitive model and groupthink model. Each of these models was drawn from the three levels of analysis of foreign policy: the systemic level (Rational Actor Model); the nation-state level (groupthink) and the individual level (the cognitive model).

Next, we will describe some of the very important models of decision-making in foreign policy.

Usually, the **Rational Actor** Theory represented “the model” of decision-making in foreign policy and the most common used in international relations (Puscas, 2009). Even though in the last decades we assisted to the expansion of literature regarding the psychology of the decision making in foreign policy in a group, in a coalition or with the leaders. Trying to explain the international events by specific goals and nations or governments represents the mark of Rational Actor Model.

By analyzing Morgenthau’s (2007) and Schelling’s (1960) interpretations regarding the international events and their evolution in order to secure a balance of power, Allison and Zelikow (2010) conclude that each author presumes that *what has to be explained is an action, a behavior which reflects an aim or intention*. Each of them admits that the actor is the *national government*, representing a state. Each of them believes that a choosing action is a calculated solution to a strategical problem,

and that for each of them, the explanation consists of indicating the aim followed by the government and the fact that the action was a rational choice (taking into account the nation's objective). These assumptions characterize Rational Actor Model, and the conceptual contrasts between Morgenthau and Schelling are obvious.

The majority of analysts interpret the international events in terms of this frame. The assumption that the actions of international relations are *acts of nations* became important in analyzing these problems, so the Rational Actor Model was rarely recognized: the explanation of an external policy phenomenon means to show how a government rationally chooses an action. So, the frame of reference could be called *classic*.

Gross-Stein (2008) said that rational models of decision-making can be used in three ways: first, they are useful as an aspiration, or a norm, but only with the full realization that foreign policy decision makers are unlikely ever to meet that norm; second, the creative use of rational choice models has uncovered many counter-intuitive and non-obvious paradoxes and traps that can be very instructive to decision makers; finally, rational choice models can be designed into small cracks that neuroscience opens up and highlights as spaces that can be used to correct some of the worst biases in decision-making.

Paul Mac Donald (2003) considers that Rational Actor Model „represents the most plausible candidate for a universal theory of social and political behavior, of which simple and intuitive assumptions keep the promise of unifications of different subdomains of political sciences”. Mintz and DeRouen (2010) say that rational actor is capable of identifying alternatives and their consequences and to select the most suitable alternative. This definition underlines the power of this model. The Rational Actor Model is an economical model, and that means that few assumptions could explain a large spectrum of foreign policy decisions and actions.

The Rational Actor Model assumes the following steps (Allison, Zelikow, 2010): (1) identifying the problem; (2) identifying and ordering the aims; (3) collecting information (could be permanent); (4) identifying the alternatives for achieving the aims; (5) analyzing the alternatives by considering the consequences and efficiency (costs and benefits) for each alternative and probabilities associated with success; (6) selecting the alternative which maximizes the chances for selecting the best alternative determined before; (7) implementing the decision; (8) monitoring and assessment.

Renshon and Renshon (2008) mentioned that the strict following of these steps does not necessarily ensure the best results. The experts and counseling groups analyze the political dilemmas and they achieve a suboptimal result. Generally, the analytical process of rational model must lead to better decisions, but not always to the best results.

In the most simple form, the Rational Actor Model links the aim with action. Knowing the aim of an actor means knowing his future behavior. By observing his behavior and by taking into account the aim of an actor identified in an action, a hypothesis could be formulated regarding the reason of what he did. The Rational Actor Model includes calculations about the situation that the actor is facing, not just objectives. This context presents threats and opportunities that the actor considers

options, with pros and cons arguments. The actor chooses alternatives that best fit their interests. In applying this model, the analyst will take into consideration the aims, options which are identified, the costs and benefits which he estimates after each option and the ease or reluctance to take risks.

Gross- Stein (2008) says that a rational decision maker should be good at attending to new information that comes along as they are making their choices. Practically, the decision-makers have to update their estimates in response to new reliable information that contains significant evidence. When President Bush was considering whether or not to go to war against Iraq, he was told that Saddam Hussein had sought to buy yellow cake uranium from Niger. This was new information to the president and it was diagnostic: it signaled that Saddam was likely seeking to develop unconventional weapons. But the information wasn't reliable or trustworthy and it should have been excluded from any kind of consideration.

The reliability of information is a threshold barrier on its way into the decision-making process. Determining the trust worthiness of any piece of information, however, is often very difficult to do. Rational process of information management are often swamped by the quick intuitive processes and deep cognitive biases that political leaders use to interpret evidence.

The author mentioned above goes to the next step with *classical* model of Rational Actor, emphasising the individual approach of a decision-maker – „people who make important choices about foreign policy need to be logical, discriminating while open to new evidence, and they need to be *coherent* and *consistent* in responding to logical arguments” (Gross-Stein, p. 103). Another quality „required” from the decision-maker is the *probability to estimate* the consequences of the options that they consider, to update these estimates as they consider new evidence, and to maximize their subjective expected utility. Models of rational choice identify the strategy that leaders should choose, given their preferences and expectations. Rational decision-makers choose the option that promises to give them what is of greatest value to them. The model of rational choice assumes that people are instrumentally rational, but given their existing preferences, people are expected to engage in an appropriate end-means calculation: „Formal models of rational choice don't claim to explain the beliefs and expectations which lead to choice, and therefore leave out most of what is important in explaining foreign policy” (Gross-Stein, p.103).

Going further on the „route of psychology” in decision-making process, Gross Stein (2008) mentioned that people, as a species, are intuitive causal thinkers and we like to think of ourselves as being rational. The most important evidence of the limits of rationality comes from psychology, and this is a reason why specialists in foreign policy have to pay attention to this new approach to the decision-making process. The author said that the work of neuroscientists is important for the analysis of foreign policy, because it is reintroducing conflict as a key feature in the choices made by decision makers: „What makes the work of rationality and neuroscience even more important is that the two tend to converge, a factor of real importance in analyses of foreign policy.” (Gross Stein, p. 103).

The second classic model of decision making is **Organizational Politics**. This model underlines the efficiency of work division, of hierarchy and of centralization associated with expertise, rationality and obedience. The followers of this model assume that it must maintain clear boundaries between politics and decision making on one side, and, on the other side, between their administration and implementation. Recent studies approach organizations in different ways (Holsti, 2006). The central premise is that decision taking in bureaucratic organizations isn't constrained only by the formal and legal norms, which intend to grow the rational and to eliminate capricious aspects of bureaucratic behavior. It appears an increase rather than a denial of political character of bureaucratization, but of other „informal” aspects of organizational behavior. Holsti says that complex organizations are composed from individuals and units with perceptions, values and interests that could be sometime conflictual and could appear from its own parochial interests („what is best for my organization is best for my career”), or different perceptions of problems appeared from work division („where you stand depends on where you stay”). The organizational and implicit norms, established before political commitments, inertia, operating standard procedures, could shape or distort the structuring of problems, the canalization of information, the use of expertise, the rate of options which will be taken into account. As a consequence, decision making at organizational level has, in its essence a political character, dominated by resources negotiation, or roles and missions and also compromise, rather than analysis (Holsti, 2006).

Holsti considers that in foreign policy this decision making model rarely conforms with the Weberian „ideal type” of rational organization. Some analysts assume that crises moments could provide reasons and means of reduction of some non-rational aspects of behavior: the crises tend to force the decisions to the top of organization, where a superior quality of intelligence is available; information penetrates directly to the top of the organization, reducing the distorted effects of information processing through different levels of organizations; and, largely, fewer parochial values will be evoked. Decisions taken over a short period of time, during a crisis, reduces the opportunities of decision making by negotiation.

Mintz and DeRouen (2010) consider that the key dynamic in the organizational politics model are the standard operating procedures (SOPs). Often governmental decisions involve little uncertainty, are not crisis decisions, and are made on the basis of some a priori guideline or administrative rule. Allison and Zelikow (2010) pull several examples of this form of decision making out of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Upon installing the missiles in Cuba, the Soviets did not make immediate efforts to hide the medium-range ballistic missiles despite the fact they were aware of America's ability to use high-altitude U-2 surveillance planes. Furthermore, the Soviets did not preinstall radar or surface-to-air missiles to defend the missile sites. Allison (1971) interprets this as a clear example of organizational decision making with its attendant SOPs. In the past, the Soviets had installed similar missile sites in the USSR without paying attention to radar or camouflage. These were not seen as vital on Soviet soil. So, when the time came for the same agency to install missile sites, they followed the SOP. In this instance, the SOP was a miserable failure for the Soviets.

Mintz, DeRouen used the term *incrementalism*, introduced by David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom. This dynamic is conservative in that it entails only minor fine-tuning of past decisions rather than a broad exploration of policy alternatives. Incrementalism leads to a decisional inertia because the same alternatives are accepted over and over. Because there is no large deviation from past choices, there is little chance of catastrophic failure resulting from one decision. Although low-risk, if left unmonitored, incrementalism can get out of control. Most budgeting decisions can be characterized as incremental. The incrementalism does not ensure that utility is maximized as it is in the rational actor model.

Because incremental decisions only make for small changes in the status quo, they rarely completely solve problems, but rather provide temporary solutions. Decision makers using incremental approaches can compartmentalize problems, so that problems can be isolated and politically acceptable solutions can be found. In this regard, the American two-party system provides abundant examples of incrementalism. A policy is decided on for a certain problem, then the policy is altered by the other party, then tried, then altered again, and so on.

Critics of the **Organizational Politics Model** assumed that focusing on bureaucratic negotiations has failed to adequately differentiate the positions of the participants. In the American system, the President isn't just another player in an organizational system. He is the last one who takes decision, but also selects the players, a process which is crucial in shaping the future decision. Also, the conception on organizational negotiation tends to underline the non-rational elements till the exclusion of original intellectual differences, which could be rooted in ample preoccupations, including disagreements regarding national interest. It is true that the process of decision making, if managed adequately by promoting and legitimizing multiple advocacy, could favor the high-class decisions.

This model is useful, especially for understanding the slipping between executive decisions and foreign policy actions, which could appear during the implementation, but could be less valuable in explaining the decision itself.

The **Bureaucratic Politics Model** is the third classic model of foreign policy decision-making. Allison and Zelikow (2010) noted that the rational model leads analysts to ascertain the nature of the problem and the alternatives, costs, and benefits associated with each alternative. This model (sometimes called the **governmental model**) looks at how decisions involving various bureaucracies can elicit political competition. The key to this model is that there is no overarching master plan and that decisions emerge from political struggle and bargaining between groups (Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff 1990). Thus, foreign policy decisions emerge within an abstract political space rather than from a formal decision procedure that relies on a formal chain of command. The actors in the bureaucratic politics model are key individuals sitting in top key organizations; each of them is trying to maximize its interests, agendas and goals. In contrast to the rational actor model, the bureaucratic politics model assumes multiple organizations and bureaucracies rather than a single actor.

Bureaucracies are hierarchical organizations that jealously protect their own turf by controlling policy in their area of expertise. Decision makers even have the incentive to negotiate internally with each other before presenting alternatives to the executive. The process may affect which information is presented to the leader and may even restrict information on additional policy options available to the leader. As Renshon and Renshon (2008) pointed out, bureaucracies are likely to limit the search for information and alternatives. Bureaucracies strive to grow so their expertise monopoly can be further consolidated. Turf wars can even result in one agency being swallowed up by a larger agency.

Bureaucratic decisions are not cut and dry. There are winning coalitions/individuals and losing coalitions/individuals. The losing side might not accept its loss and attempt to prevail despite the reality of the situation. This can lead to fragmented decision-making (Cashman, 1993). Middle level policy decisions are well represented by the bureaucratic politics model. There is typically not enough time for bureaucratic politics to play out during crises.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model is described in a synthetical manner by Jackson and Sorensen (2007):

- bureaucrats and birocracy are driven by agency interests in order to ensure their survival;
- agencies and bureaucracies are involved in a constant competition for various stakes and prizes (the net effect is a policy process whereby struggles for organizational survival, expansion and growth, and imperialism are inevitable);
- competition produces an intra-agency bureaucratic culture and behavior pattern (the axiom “where you stand depends on where you sit” accurately describes this condition);
- bureaucracies have a number of advantages over elected officials in the realm of policy-making (they include expertise, continuity, responsibility for implementation and longevity; these characteristics create an asymmetrical power and dependence relationship between the professional bureaucrats and the elected officials);
- policy made in the arena of bureaucratic politics is characterized by bargaining, accommodation and compromise;
- in the bureaucratic politics system proposals for change are driven by the political considerations. (bureaucracies have a deep-seated interest in self-preservation);
- by its nature, bureaucratic politics raises questions concerning control, accountability, responsiveness and responsibility in a democratic society.

Mintz and DeRouen (2010) provides an interesting bureaucratic politics model of presidential decision-making and policy implementation, presented first by Halperin in 1974. He notes that presidents, except during rare events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, usually do not indicate specific actors, methods, or timetables when they should make decisions. The presidents make vague decisions after considerable delays and typically do not offer a coherent plan that is applicable to a range of related issues.

Halperin provides an example of his model using President Johnson's decision on the antiballistic missile system (ABM) in the 1960s (Mintz, DeRouen, 2010). The decision reveals the politics and coalition building inherent into the bureaucratic model. The decision involved great discretion in the president's release of information and his stand on the issue, and the president sent out mixed signals throughout the decision process. These mixed signals were manifested in three apparently different purposes for the system. Ostensibly, the president wanted funding for the system but would delay deployment pending an arms talk with the Soviets; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued for the system for protection against the Soviets; the Joint Chiefs of Staff and key senators on the Armed Services Committee wanted it for protection against the Chinese; and the system eventually authorized was designed to protect cities against a Soviet attack. Halperin (1974) demonstrates that President Johnson was able to use vague decision making to maintain a coalition between Secretary of Defense McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Senate Armed Services Chairman Richard Russell. The president played his cards close to his chest so that each side thought he was championing its cause. In this sense, the bureaucratic model took on conflict-solving properties.

In Halperin's bureaucratic politics model, the bureaucracy reigns over the president. Presidential policy goals must be communicated to department heads to begin the implementation process. There is no direct and simultaneous presidential policy mechanism. The result of this effect is evidenced by the ABM policy decision. The ABM decision was shaped by the president's general policy desires, which in turn set the process in motion. The ambiguous nature of the president's goals served to preclude any single actor's views from dominating the decision process.

A Rational Actor Interpretation

The administration's alternatives in this case were: "stop the war" or "continue the war." The rational actor model calls for detailed cost-benefit calculations along each dimension of the decision. Selecting the alternative with the highest "net gain" – the best alternative, it makes a decision.

A "stop the war" decision differs considerably from one made to initiate conflict, when costs and utilities are typically more uncertain. The participation in a conflict allows the leader to more lucidly perceive what the war is costing him in its social, economic, military and political dimensions. The escalation or termination of conflicts entails the calculation of benefits and costs along several dimensions. The military, strategic, political, economic, and diplomatic factors, the balance of forces, and other conditions are important factors affecting such decisions. In order to terminate war, at least one of the participants has to reconsider his estimation of the relative advantages and disadvantages of continuing hostilities. A change in the calculus is an essential prerequisite to the termination of war. However, the process of making compromises and reaching agreement on the termination of hostilities, may be hindered by loss aversion because each side may view its own concessions as losses that loom

larger than the gains achieved by the concessions of the adversary. The very willingness of one party to make a particular concession immediately reduces the perceived value of the concession.

When faced with the decision of *when to stop the war* and with *his popularity skyrocketing*, the president selected the risk-averse alternative of *stopping the war* and rejected the risky alternative of invading Baghdad and ousting Saddam from power. Increasing the gap in the military balance between the Allied Forces and Saddam's forces could not have compensated for the political and military risks involved in continuing the war. The president had decided that the potential costs might be excessive in relation to possible future gains and therefore decided to terminate hostilities. The success of the military operation placed the president in the domain of gain, both politically and militarily and led to the rejection of the "continue the march to Baghdad" alternative.

An Organizational Politics Explanation

The organizational politics model provides a partial explanation of the 1991 decision not to invade Iraq. If we treat members of the U.S. coalition as entities in an organizational politics model, it is clear that when the war ended, their SOP was not to invade Iraq in the absence of UN authority to go beyond driving Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. This decision was the result of fear that an invasion would play into Saddam's hands in characterizing the war as occupation and aggression by the United States.

A Bureaucratic Politics Explanation

The bureaucratic politics model does not provide an adequate explanation of the decision not to invade Iraq in 1991. The U.S. decision exhibited a relatively high consensus among various bureaucracies that make up the U.S. government. Reports indicated that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell seemed wary of using force to remove Saddam from power. The State Department was likewise reluctant to recommend such a move, mainly because of the fear of dissolving the multi-country coalition, including Arab nations that participated in the broad coalition. The National Security Council supported a limited war that would only remove Hussein from Kuwait. An invasion of Iraq would mean changing objectives in midstream and would be risky. Finally, the White House believed that the cost of the invasion would be too high, and choosing not to invade could be easily justified.

This consensus among U.S. entities, bureaucracies, and organizations does not therefore support the bureaucratic politics model, which would have predicted bargaining among bureaucracies over their role in the invasion. Whereas such a process characterized inter-agency bargaining in the decision to force Iraq out of Kuwait, it was considerably less evident in the decision not to continue to Baghdad in 1991.

Conclusions

This article presents models used for decision-making process in foreign policy. Even though the rational actor model was considered the reference point in explaining international events, and besides its solid support in social science research, it has been the target of criticism and revisionism. The organizational and bureaucratic politics models, with their emphasises on SOPs (standard operational procedures), political struggle, and coalition building, demonstrate that the rational model is not the final word in foreign policy decision-making. Psychological factors are largely ignored in the rational model.

The psychological approach of decision-making process in foreign policy will be the next part of this study. Decisions at the top rung of government are usually taken by small groups or powerful individuals and this tendency will open new ways in the analysis of international relations. The psychology of leaders is an important factor in the transitional periods of international system and internal political systems/regimes.

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